WJEC/Eduqas RS for A2/Yr2: Religion and Ethics (DRAFT)

T1 Ethical Thought

As Hayward writes, ‘One conclusion that can be drawn from emotivism is that value judgements are not rational and so no rational agreement is possible on ethical matters and no knowledge can be had of them.’ Differences in opinion only heighten this problem and complicate matters. Emotivism suggests no way in which differences of opinion can be resolved; it can only observe that they happen. However, history demonstrates that clear decisions have been made for the better and to say that it was simply down to emotions ridicules these important ethical decisions. Finally, the fact that it reduces morality to emotions which have no rational basis nor justification, means that the whole idea of basic moral principles is unfounded and suggests that they do not exist anyway. The other extreme is that there is no limit on moral principles that can be identified through emotions but that they are so conflicting that no sense of coherence can be found amongst them all. Ethical debate becomes a pointless activity Related to the above challenge, if there are no basic moral principles then ethical debate becomes a pointless activity because we need to ask, ‘what are we debating?’ If we cannot differentiate ‘good’ from ‘bad’ and ‘right’ from ‘wrong’ and only have feelings to revert to then why bother at all? Certainly, if ethical debate is not pointless it would certainly not be rational and could provide no definitive answers. By reducing ethical debate to trying to influence each other’s’ attitudes then it becomes no more than an exercise in propaganda. Surely this cannot be the case if an argument is presented with sufficient evidence? The problem is that if one does follow the inclination of Emotivism then it does not address why many feel that whether or not the basis of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is established it is also possible to present ethical debate. Ethical debate is not just about emotions but also to do with a process of reasoning using evidence to support an argument. It can be acknowledged that the outcome of the argument may be explained as personal opinion but the argument itself is still important. Indeed, how is that any different to Prichard’s Intuitionism? Therefore to suggest that ethical debate is pointless appears ‘to be throwing the baby out with the bathwater’. There is no universal agreement that some actions are wrong Although it could be argued that there is some value still in moral debate, even if it just about persuasion, it will never be able to establish a unanimous, universal agreement on those actions that are considered as wrong. There is no sense of authority to appeal to. In addition, what would happen in ethical debate? History has proven that minority interests and ‘emotions’ (to use Ayer’s perspective) have actually been the correct way forward. Look at slavery, homosexuality and women’s rights not as moral issues but as relating to basic human rights and the law. The outcome has shown that basic principles of what is wrong can be established through ethical argument. Emotivism does not seem to reflect what has actually happened through ethical debate. There are many more examples that could be used even if we do not have a set of guidelines established and put everything ‘ethical’ down to personal emotions. If we accept Emotivism, Mackie has pointed out that we are not clearly differentiating between the things we disapprove of. He comments that there is a vast difference between his ‘dislike of curries’ and that of genocide! Therefore, it seems that saying that there is no universal agreement that some actions are wrong would be contradicting what actually happens in reality and is not adequate enough to explain our different types of disapproval.

Key quotes Stevenson analyses emotive meaning by connecting meaning to use. The purpose of moral judgements is not to state facts, but to influence how we behave through expressions of approval and disapproval. Words with emotive meaning do just that. If moral language is just descriptive, how can moral truths motivate us? Emotivism, by contrast, connects caring, approving, disapproving, with the very meaning of ethical words. (Lacewing) The main difficulty with logical positivism is that according to the principle of verification, the principle of verification itself is meaningless … But if the principle of verification is meaningless, then what it claims cannot be true. So it does not give us any reason to believe that the claims of ethics are meaningless. (Lacewing) The emotivist defines ‘morally good’ as an ‘expression of approval’. The emotivist is unable to distinguish between my dislike of curries from my dislike of genocide. But the difference between the two is profound. I dislike curry because I don’t like its taste. I abhor genocide because it’s immoral. (MacIntyre)

DRAFT

Not liking the taste of a certain food is a very different expression of disapproval from disagreeing about whether one approves of cruelty to animals.

57