WJEC/Eduqas RS for A2/Yr2: Religion and Ethics (DRAFT)

T1 Ethical Thought

moral judgements, but we cannot distinguish between pointing to the evidence itself and pointing to that for which it is supposed to be evidence. Which means that in the scientific sense it is not evidence at all. (Ayer) In conclusion, Ayer revisits what he stated in the first place. He was not set out to demonstrate that ‘morals are trivial or unimportant, or that people ought not to bother with them’ and nor did he conclude this. Ayer would consider this a value judgement of his own and so by his own method, unverifiable, as there would be no logical justification for this conclusion. His conclusion is that ‘all moral theories, intuitionist, naturalistic, objectivist, emotive, and the rest, in so far as they are philosophical theories, are neutral as regards actual conduct’. In other words, they tell us nothing about the actions themselves but simply may inform us what people are doing when they make moral judgements. Ayer then distinguishes between ethics proper, that is the first three of his four categories listed above (namely, experience, virtue and value) to which no true moral philosopher should be ‘presumptuous’ enough to engage, and meta-ethics. He sees meta-ethics as the true realm of philosophy, and indeed, the subject with which he has himself been engaging with in attempting to define and analyse ethical propositions. It would be beneficial here to present his conclusion: I hope that I have gone some way towards making clear what the theory which I am advocating is. Let me now say what it is not. In the first place, I am not saying that morals are trivial or unimportant, or that people ought not to bother with them . For this would itself be a judgement of value, which I have not made and do not wish to make. And even if I did wish to make it, it would have no logical connection with my theory. For the theory is entirely on the level of analysis; it is an attempt to show what people are doing when they make moral judgements; it is not a set of suggestions as to what moral judgements they are to make. And this is true of all moral philosophy, as I understand it. All moral theories, intuitionist, naturalistic, objectivist, emotive, and the rest, in so far as they are philosophical theories, are neutral as regards actual conduct. To speak technically, they belong to the field of meta-ethics, not ethics proper. That is why it is silly, as well as presumptuous, for any one type of philosopher to pose as the champion of virtue. And it is also one reason why many people find moral philosophy an unsatisfying subject. For they mistakenly look to the moral philosopher for guidance. Key quote Again, when I say that moral judgements are emotive rather than descriptive, that they are persuasive expressions of attitudes and not statements of fact … I am not saying that nothing is good or bad, right or wrong, or that it does not matter what we do. (Ayer, On the Analysis of Moral Judgements) AO1 Activity Why not research the Logical Positivists on the Internet to find out more about what they thought regarding ethics.

DRAFT

Study tip It is good to see a link between philosophers/philosophical ideas, for example, how Hume, Russell and Ayer follow a particular empiricist tradition.

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