WJEC/Eduqas RS for A2/Yr2: Religion and Ethics (DRAFT)

T1 Ethical Thought

be ‘self-evident’ just means that it cannot be deemed true or false and, in that case, in the words of Richard Norman, ‘They make no statements and they convey no knowledge’. This principle of non-verification was taken up by Alfred Ayer in relation to his work with the Logical Positivists who were all mainly from mathematical, scientific or engineering backgrounds. The Logical Positivists, you will have, or will learn from the Philosophy topic on Religious Language, were interested in types of knowledge and language that could be verified through either analytical or synthetic means by appeal to logic or empiricism. This in itself relates back to Hume’s Fork. Warnock summarises his position well when she writes: ‘Ayer’s general contention is, briefly, that any statement that has meaning must fall into one of two categories. Either, it must be analytic, that is necessarily true but not concerned with empirical matters of fact; or it must be empirical. If it is empirical, it can never be more than probable; it is, in fact, a hypothesis. Both the meaning and the probability of the hypothesis are established by empirical verification. That is to say, if a statement is to qualify for the second category, it must be capable of verification by sense experience.’ The problem for ethical propositions is that to be verified they must fit into one of the two categories of Hume’s Fork (see earlier diagram and explanation). Either, they fit into the category of logic, mathematics and symbols as analytic propositions; or, they fall into the second category of the empirical experience of science and propositions of empirical matter of fact. Key quote Even the most enthusiastic intuitionist would never maintain that one literally The problem is, as Hume, Russell and Ayer analysed, ethical propositions do not fall into either category. Furthermore, as Hume had observed years earlier, ‘when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it’. Hume points out that such feelings are ‘not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind’. Reason cannot find a motive for an action and neither can an ethical proposition be grounded in anything else other than our own ‘experience’. Whilst Hume gave a typical Naturalist account of such feelings by linking them ‘objectively’ to biological heritage and social conditioning, Russell and Ayer drew a very different conclusion. Key quote On Hume’s account, our ethical nature is characterised by the capacity for sympathy, or the ability to feel with (empathise with) others. On such an account any variation in moral codes must be a consequence of differing social conditions, while ultimately all such codes must express some fundamentals which humanity shares. (Hayward) In order to discover precisely what Ayer concluded, it would be beneficial to refer closely to his argument presented in chapter 6 of his seminal work, Language, Truth and Logic (LTL) . At the outset, however, Ayer never proposed that ethical propositions were of no value or worth or that ethical debate was not worthy of pursuit, as he states clearly in later writings, but simply that they are not factual or saw or heard the goodness of an action. (Warnock) There are no other categories of knowledge and language.

Key quote Questions as to ‘value’ lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge. That is to say, when we assert that this or that has ‘value’, we are giving expression to our own emotions, not to a fact which would still be true if our personal feelings were different. (Russell)

DRAFT

Alfred Ayer was influenced by Hume’s empiricism and also the scientific approach of the Logical Positivists.

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