WJEC/Eduqas RS for A2/Yr2: Religion and Ethics (DRAFT)

T1 Ethical Thought

Linked to the idea of conflicting duties is the criticism that differences occur because an individual is more or less left to their own devices and no amount of logical discourse could deter a decision because Intuitionism is not based on nor answerable to the process of logical reasoning. As Norman writes again, ‘Moreover, since the truths which are supposed to be self-evident are, by definition, ones for which no reasons can be given, there can be no way of resolving the disagreement or of showing which of the views in question is really the apprehension of a self- evident truth.’ In response, the deontological intuitionists would argue that although there may be conflicts and claims to self-evident truths, this does not mean that the truths themselves are conflicting as in any given situation there is one single intuitive truth – it is a case of distinguishing between true intuition and those guided by consequentialism and empirical evidence towards a very different goal. As Stratton-Lake argues, ‘It is worth noting that moral disagreement does not imply that people have different intuitions … Similarly, it is plausible to suppose that many act consequentialists still have the intuition that it is wrong to harvest organs from a healthy but non-consenting donor to save five other lives. But because they have persuaded themselves of the truth of act consequentialism, they would not believe this act is wrong.’ Key quote Finally, Ethical Intuitionists allowed that various other factors can lead to disagreement. Clarke, for instance, allowed that stupidity, corruption, or perverseness … John Balguy also acknowledges that self-evident moral principles … have been, doubted, ‘even by philosophers and men of letters’ … And Price maintained that all forms of knowledge, including intuitive knowledge, may be evident in different degrees. Intuition may be clear and perfect but may sometimes be faint and obscure. Such variance in degrees of clarity allows that a self-evident proposition may be imperfectly and obscurely grasped, and this may lead someone to deny its truth … Given all these ways in which the truth of a self-evident proposition may be missed, it is no surprise that there is no universal assent. But the absence of universal assent is quite consistent with self-evidence, as long as one does not regard ‘self-evidence’ to mean, or imply, obviousness. (Standford/ Stratton-Lake) Overall there are many philosophers who see moral disagreement as throwing doubt over the claim that moral propositions are self-evident. If specific moral propositions are known and correctly understood, then, everyone who had an understanding would accept them and there would be universal agreement and acknowledgement between these people. Therefore, since there is not such universal agreement, then there can be no self-evident moral propositions.

Key quotes Philosophers who claim that fundamental value-judgements are self-evident are not necessarily committed to claiming that their truth is always apparent to everyone. (Norman) It is not surprising, then, that other philosophers have concluded that these fundamental value-judgements are really not the expression of self-evident truths at all; they are merely the expressions of personal preferences, of feelings and emotions, of individual likes and dislikes. (Norman)

DRAFT

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