WJEC/Eduqas RS for A2/Yr2: Religion and Ethics (DRAFT)

WJEC / Eduqas Religious Studies for A Level Year 2 and A2 Religion and Ethics

3. The duties are specific (e.g. to keep promises and not to harm others) and do not derive from a more general consequentialist duty to promote good consequences. As Thomas Hurka writes, ‘The main reason we ought to keep our promises or not harm others is just that we ought to; those duties, like the normative realm as a whole and moral duty in general, are self-standing.’ Key quotes The improper question is supposed to be the demand for reasons why something which has the characteristic of being obligatory, has this characteristic. All demands, Prichard says, for proof that something is a duty are mistaken. (Warnock) In 1909 Prichard published his only book, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge , which was an account of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism … The book’s main conclusion is that ‘knowledge is sui generis and therefore a “theory” of knowledge is impossible. Knowledge is knowledge, and any attempt to state it in terms of something else must end in describing something which is not knowledge’. (Dancy) Although the specific duties may conflict, the fact is that they are not reducible to one basic duty like consequentialism and are indeed independent of consequentialist thinking. As Thomas Hurka explains, ‘The various duties can conflict, but when they do there are no rules for deciding between them: we can only make a direct intuitive judgement about which duty is stronger.’ How this process is activated is the subject of the next section on general and moral reasoning. Two ways of thinking (general and moral) The last section ended with considering the fact that duties can conflict when an ethical decision needs to be made. In one sense, this is illogical if there is only one right way to act. It may be that we respond that ‘the real world is not as simple as that and moral issues are complex’ but this response is very much based in what Prichard calls the world of general reasoning . General reasoning is basically using the empirical evidence around us to present logical argument. For any moral decision, the appreciation of certain facts concerning the circumstances involved is referred to as ‘ preliminaries ’. However, such preliminaries, no matter how strong, do not hold any obligation. In addition, Prichard speaks not of conflicting duties but of the fact that general reasoning may throw up different ‘ claims ’ and the ultimate ‘claim’ may well be the ultimate moral duty but it does not necessarily have to be . Prichard was careful to point out that an appeal to general reasoning must not let it become the driver for recognising one’s proper moral duty; only intuition can do this. Moral reasoning is the recognition and assertion of one’s duty by intuitive thought. It is present in our unreflective consciousness according to Prichard. Key quotes Prichard makes clear, being in a position to grasp the self-evidence of an obligation may require appreciating certain facts about one’s circumstances that are ’preliminaries’ in the process of thinking about ethical issues … part of a process that Prichard calls ’general’ in contrast to moral thinking. (Timmons) If we ask ourselves what this something else is, we seem driven to say that … what is called a conflict of duties is really a conflict of claims on us to act in different ways, arising out of various circumstances of the whole situation in which we are placed. (Timmons)

Key terms Claims: Prichard’s term for an argument put together from general reasoning General reasoning: using the empirical evidence around us to present logical argument Moral reasoning: application of intuition Preliminaries: gathering of claims Unre ective consciousness: Prichard’s explanation that intuition is not determined by philosophical re ection

1.18 How did Prichard disagree with

Moore about what we ‘ought’ to do?

DRAFT

Specification content H. A. Prichard: two ways of thinking (general and moral).

Although it is usual to consider evidence and circumstances of a moral decision, these preliminaries do not provide us with any moral obligation according to Prichard.

1.19 How is general reasoning different from moral reasoning according to Prichard?

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