WJEC/Eduqas RS for A2/Yr2: Religion and Ethics (DRAFT)

T4 Determinism and free will

We have, on the one hand, a study of the different views of Augustine and Calvin in trying to understand what is actually meant by predestination; in some ways this mirrors the debate between hard and soft determinism in philosophy. We then have, on the other hand, Pelagius and Arminius who offer arguments as to how to understand the concept of free will, and, in the case of Arminius, within the context of predestination. In some ways the division of free will and predestination is quite artificial for all four thinkers as they are all engaged with the same task. This is trying to make sense of whether the traditional understanding of the nature of God as being in control of and knowing everything (for want of a better word God as the ‘Determinator’), is compatible with the notion of free will. The best way to understand this debate is to reconsider something that was covered in year 1 when analysing the problem of evil. The Australian philosopher John Mackie clearly identified the nub of the issue when he raised his concerns about what he called the paradox of omnipotence. The essence of this is that if God is omnipotent, then to suggest there is something that God is not able to control or do then we are admitting that God cannot be omnipotent. In other words, if we allow free will for humanity then how can God be omnipotent? Mackie’s argument about the theodicies offered to answer the problem of evil and suffering was that each one had to re-define and clarify what the word omnipotence meant. That is, ‘God is omnipotent but …’ For Mackie this was a failure for the traditional understanding of God because they change the premise of the argument, i.e. the meaning of omnipotence, and thus undermine its validity. The only solution Mackie sees to this is to ‘deny that God is a continuing being, that any time can be assigned to his actions at all’, or, ‘by putting God outside time’; in other words, the concept of omnipotence becomes redundant. However, for theologians defending God, it was not a failure at all, but rather a clarification of exactly what is meant by the traditional understanding of God, and in particular, the fuller meaning of the term omnipotence. For instance, Mackie’s assumption was that he failed to distinguish between having something and using it. In a sense Mackie definition of God’s characteristic of omnipotence is absolute power, authority and strength but something that is a constant not just in what it is but what it does . Therefore, Mackie’s own understanding of omnipotence is skewed. Religious believers can argue that omnipotence has a definitive absolute of being but also by logic an infinite range of action . In other words to say God is omnipotent does not mean God can only do omnipotent things; God must be allowed to exercise the full range of possible actions. Similar to Hick’s epistemic distance , the calculated step backwards is not that God ‘gives up’ control or ‘allows’ freedom but that God exercises omnipotence within the full range of possibilities that omnipotence allows. To return to Mackie’s paradox, Mackie had this the wrong way around: it should be ‘Can God create something that God chooses not to exercise/use control over ?’ The answer ‘yes’ is not denying omnipotence at all as God is not losing power, but using power.

Are free will and the idea of an omnipotent ‘Determinator’ really a paradox?

Key terms Epistemic distance: basically a gap of knowledge between humanity and God that God intends in order to allow human freedom Paradox: a statement of reasoning that appears to be logical but ends up with an illogical conclusion by contradicting itself Key quotes This leads us to what I call the Paradox of Omnipotence: can an omnipotent being make things which he cannot subsequently control? Or, what is practically equivalent to this, can an omnipotent being make rules which then bind himself? (Mackie) It is clear that this is a paradox: the questions cannot be answered satisfactorily either in the affirmative or the negative. If we answer ‘Yes’, it follows that if God actually makes things which he cannot control, or makes rules which bind himself, he is not omnipotent once he has made them: there are then things which he cannot do. But if we answer ‘No’, we are immediately asserting that there are things which he cannot do, that is to say that he is already not omnipotent. (Mackie)

DRAFT

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